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Valorization 
 
In accordance with Article 23 of the regulation governing the attainment of doctoral 
degrees at Maastricht University, this section discusses the valorization opportunities 
of the dissertation.  
This thesis studies the role of social capital in countries experiencing radical 
institutional transformation such as former USSR countries. The study was based on 
historical empirical evidence from Armenia.  
The findings showed that the institutional environment matters in determining 
opportunities for firms in Armenia, and it is particularly significant if we consider 
firms’ embeddedness in social networks. Social networks serve as a mechanism for 
firms to cope with and overcome uncertainty of volatile market conditions. Social 
networks have been used to compensate for the difficulties of market exchange 
between firms, to access financial resources and to gain information. These networks 
played an important role in knowledge and skills transfer and diffusion, as well as in 
the effectiveness with which firms used new knowledge and skills.  
The institutional aspect was presented to show how volatile and newly created market-
supporting institutions were not functioning very efficiently and were not sufficient to 
secure a proper transition from a planned to a market economy given the inherited 
soviet past. As the transition was not smooth and gradual, it has disrupted not only the 
“bad” institutions, but also the “good” ones such as the science and education system 
that Armenia had developed during the soviet past. The thesis discussed that the lack 
of experience and understanding of the soviet past caused lost opportunities while 
creating a new national innovation system.   
Today, when societal transition is a hot topic for both developed and developing 
countries, studying post-soviet experience provides insights on the hidden factors that 
affect the transition such as past experience, people’s mentality and social networks. 
The contexts and conditions may differ from country to country, yet some lessons 
learned from the former-soviet countries can be very useful and applicable for steering 
the transition processes in other countries. For example, in the era of disruptive 
technologies, developed countries are transitioning to a more technological society, 
while some developing countries are passing from closed to market-supporting 
institutional changes (e.g., Cuba, Burma). The examination of former soviet countries 
including Armenia, showed that one of the most important aspects is to understand 
and evaluate the country’s existing potential and create better conditions to secure its 
transformation into a new system (e.g., transformation of National Innovation 
System).  
Neo-liberal reforms and the lack of state policies in promoting the country’s 
innovation system left economic agents alone to find solutions. In this situation, pre-
existing social networks became the only trustworthy channels with which economic 
agents were able to observe reality, and deal with ambiguity and uncertainties arising 
with the process of economic transformation. The central concern of this study was to 
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analyze how newly privatized firms were able to utilize the local networks, and what 
kind of value these networks provided to those firms.  
One of the important inter-firm networks, examined this thesis, is the board members 
network (the network formed by individual board members who have membership on 
one or more firm boards). This study extends the application of social capital theory to 
board networks which were relatively less examined compared to alliance literature. 
Applying insights from social capital theory, the study proposes that “structural” and 
“content” attributes of board member networks are key levers underlying the level of 
social capital presented by these networks for firms. The rationale behind these two 
aspects of the social capital is that there is a value how a firm is positioned in the board 
network levels as well as what are the qualities of the partner firms. In addition, it was 
found that there is a complementarity between a firm’s position in the network and 
certain qualities possessed by its partners. For example, if a firm is embedded in a 
network where linked firms have greater financial resources, the focal firm has a 
greater likelihood of accessing financial support from partners than a firm that is not 
connected to a “rich” network.  
One of the interesting findings is that the analysis shows that social capital may have 
differentiated impact on firm finances vs. innovative performance: for example, our 
results show that network closure is negative for firm innovation, while it has a 
positive impact on financial performance. Interestingly, for financial performance, 
findings suggest that both structural holes and network closure are important. This 
supports arguments related to transition economies, where firms need to pass through 
re-structuring in order to adapt to a new and turbulent environment caused by the 
collapse of the centralized planning system. Market instability and a volatile 
institutional environment (e.g., underdeveloped banking system, limited access to 
formal financial support) enhance the value of reciprocal ties, as they are credible 
guarantees for market exchange. In this case, network closure provides more 
opportunities for reciprocity. However, at the same time, a brokerage position also 
provides the firm more opportunities to navigate and to access resources that others 
are not able to access, which became more important when a firm is seeking new and 
innovative solutions. Therefore, when firm innovativeness is measured, network 
closure is an impediment as it opposes the brokerage position.  
Corporate governance was a new phenomenon in Armenia, and the board governing 
rules and regulations are still under consideration. The results of the studies have an 
implication for the design of these rules. If the board network became too cliquish and 
homogenous in terms of industry, for example, it can induce a big concentration of 
market power in a small number of firms. This will reduce the chances of firm entry in 
the market outside of the “group”. Similarly, if the distribution of betweeness centrality 
became too skewed, there will be a small number of firms that control information and 
resources available through board network. Depending on the structure of the board 
network, it can potentially produce either economic benefits or inefficiencies.  
As the market-supporting reforms in transition economies started with privatization 
reforms which created conditions for unequal distribution of national property and 
wealth, the board directorship can be a useful instrument to soften or harden the 
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further evolution of the power concentration in the economy. In addition, due to the 
weak institutional set-up, board networks were instrumental for the firms in Armenia 
to access various resources they depended on to reduce environmental uncertainty and 
maintain their position in the market. Yet, trough creating better board membership 
rules targeted towards diversity and inclusiveness, it can offset the initial power 
concentration in the economy and create better opportunities for equal access to 
capital and competitiveness.      
The results and the empirical evidence provided by this study can be implemented to 
improve and design better g board governing rules in the transitional countries, where 
the corporate governance is a relatively new institution.  
  
